Calibrating Judicial Scrutiny of Agency Enforcement Decrees by Jordan, Hamilton
Hamilton Jordan FINALPROD.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2016 5:09 PM 
 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 
  
Calibrating Judicial Scrutiny of Agency  
Enforcement Decrees 
W. Hamilton Jordan* 
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 57 
I. Judicial Skepticism of Agency Enforcement Decrees......................... 61 
A. Consent Decrees in Federal Law Enforcement .......................................... 61 
B. Rakoff’s Revolution: Citigroup I ............................................................... 62 
C. The Second Circuit Cuts Back: Citigroup II ............................................. 66 
D. Additional Judicial Skepticism of Agency Enforcement Decrees ............... 68 
II. Hidden Hard Look Review ......................................................................... 72 
A. “Hard Look” Review ................................................................................. 72 
B. Citigroup I: Taking a “Hard Look” at Proposed Enforcement 
Decrees ...................................................................................................... 75 
III. Calibrating the Optimal Approach ....................................................... 78 
A. Citigroup I: How the Court Went Too Far .............................................. 78 
B. Citigroup II: How the Second Circuit Overcorrected ............................... 83 
C. A Suggested Middle Ground ..................................................................... 85 





Of all the civil law enforcement tools at federal agencies’ disposal, perhaps 
none is more important than the enforcement decree—a court-approved and 
often injunction-backed settlement between a federal agency and a regulated 
defendant in a civil suit. Several enforcement agencies, including the Securities 
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and Exchange Commission, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
and the Federal Trade Commission, resolve most of their enforcement actions 
this way.1 This is hardly surprising. Litigation is costly, trials are unpredictable, 
and agencies have limited funding. Settling enforcement actions allows agencies 
to preserve their resources and prosecute a broader swath of violations.2 Settle-
ment is often attractive to regulated parties, too, allowing them to avoid the risk 
and publicity of trial, often without admitting any wrongdoing.3 
An agreement to settle an enforcement action is usually memorialized in a 
consent decree. And a consent decree—unlike a regular settlement, where the 
parties simply agree to dismiss the case—requires judicial approval. That’s be-
cause the decree does something more than commemorate a negotiated resolu-
 1. See Brief  for Petitioner at 23, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 
(2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-5227, 11-5375, 11-5242) (representing that the SEC resolved 
nearly 90% of its recent enforcement actions within the Second Circuit by consent 
decree); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2010: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2010) (cataloging the number of consent agreements in FTC 
antitrust enforcement actions from 2005 to 2010); P. DAVID LOPEZ, EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL FISCAL YEAR 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT 62 (2009) (stating that 79.3% of FY2009 EEOC suit resolutions were 
consent decrees); see also Richard M. Cooper, The Need for Oversight of Agency 
Policies for Settling Enforcement Actions, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 835 (2007) (“The 
vast majority of enforcement actions by federal agencies against public companies 
and other major institutions in our society end in settlements, not in contested 
proceedings.”); John M. Nannes, Termination, Modification, and Enforcement of 
Antitrust Consent Decrees, 15 ANTITRUST, Fall  2000, at 55 (explaining that the 
Department of Justice has resolved most of its antitrust enforcement actions by 
consent decree); Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, 
Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy Making,  1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327 
(“The vast majority of environmental enforcement actions brought by the 
government is resolved by negotiated settlement.”). 
 2. See, e.g., SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“While it gives up a 
number of advantages when it proceeds by injunction rather than by litigation, 
including the filing of findings of fact and court opinions clearly setting forth the 
reasons for the result in a particular case, the SEC is thus able to conserve its own 
and judicial resources . . . .”); SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d 
Cir. 1972) (“The SEC can bring the large number of enforcement actions it does 
only because in all but a few cases consent decrees are entered.”); cf. Chi. Bd. of 
Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Agencies must compare the value 
of pursuing one case against the value of pursuing another; declining a particular 
case hardly means that the SEC’s lawyers and economists will go twiddle their 
thumbs; case-versus-case is the daily tradeoff.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Clifton, 700 F.2d at 748; Cooper, supra note 1, at 843 (observing that 
regulated entities “commonly view the prospect of civil litigation against the 
government and administrative sanctions as far worse than settling on the 
government’s terms”); Percival, supra note 1, at 335 (explaining that when private 
defendants settle environmental enforcement actions they “usually agree, without 
admitting liability, to change their behavior in a particular way”). 
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tion to a controversy: it serves as an enforceable court order.4 This carries sig-
nificant benefits for the agency, the most obvious being that the decree is en-
forceable by the court’s contempt power. If the regulated party breaks the deal 
later on, the agency need not file a new suit—it can simply return to the court 
and seek sanctions.5 
Despite the prevalence and significance of agency enforcement decrees, fed-
eral courts currently do not agree on a uniform standard of review to apply 
when deciding whether to approve such decrees.6 For decades, courts mostly 
relied on the same general framework for review, agreeing that an agency en-
forcement decree must be fair, adequate, and reasonable to win judicial approv-
al—with the added qualifier that any injunctive relief must accord with (or at 
least not disserve) the public interest.7 With occasional exceptions, this frame-
 4. See Kasper v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[A] 
decree is not exactly a contract; it is an exercise of federal power, enforceable by 
contempt.”); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 321, 324-25 (1988) (“[A] consent decree is neither a contract nor a 
judgment—and it is both.”). 
 5. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 325; see also Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of 
Separation: Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 
60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 279-80 (2010) (“This procedure will likely be quicker and 
simpler—and lead to a more complete and effective remedy—than when the 
terms are solely put into a settlement agreement.”). But see id. at 287 (observing 
that a movant seeking “[t]o prevail on an application for civil contempt” must 
satisfy “a higher burden—the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard—rather 
than the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard that applies to contract 
actions”). 
 6. Note, Securities Regulation—Consent Decrees—Second Circuit Clarifies That 
Court’s Review of an SEC Settlement Should Focus on Procedural Propriety, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1288 (2015) (“Although the use of consent decrees is an 
established practice, in most contexts courts have struggled to define the 
appropriate level of deference due when they review decrees.”). In some 
contexts—like enforcement of U.S. antitrust law, governed in part by the Tunney 
Act—Congress has provided a statutory framework for courts to employ when 
reviewing proposed enforcement decrees. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2012). Though 
this Article draws on antitrust cases to highlight the importance and prevalence of 
agency enforcement decrees, its primary aim is to address how courts should best 
review consent decrees in the absence of statutory guidance on the matter. 
 7. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(noting that courts “ha[ve] the duty” to approve a negotiated consent decree 
“unless it is ‘unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable’”) (quoting SEC v. Randolph, 736 
F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984)); EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 
889 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The district court may not deny approval of a consent decree 
unless it is unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate.”); Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529 
(“Unless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be 
approved”); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 20 (describing the fair, 
reasonable, and adequate standard as “the only standard imposed by federal courts 
across the country”) (emphasis in original). 
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work usually led district judges to approve agency enforcement decrees.8 But in 
recent years, several district courts have displayed increased skepticism of agen-
cy enforcement decrees, sometimes rejecting settlement proposals after con-
cluding that the underlying terms fail to satisfy the well-worn “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate” standard.9 One federal court of appeals has reined in these rejec-
tions, recently announcing a new framework that removes “adequacy” from the 
framework of review and ensures district courts play only a minor role in polic-
ing proposed enforcement decrees for unreasonableness.10 
Given these recent shifts in the legal landscape, and considering that the ju-
diciary’s role in reviewing proposed enforcement decrees is still unclear in most 
circuits, it’s worth asking how courts should best proceed when asked to ap-
prove enforcement decrees. This Article furthers that inquiry. Part I examines 
recent judicial skepticism of proposed enforcement decrees, focusing on one 
especially notable example: U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff’s rejection of a 
proposed agreement between the SEC and Citigroup.11 It then explains how the 
Second Circuit, in reversing Judge Rakoff, set out a new standard of review that 
limits judicial oversight of proposed enforcement decrees. It also touches on 
other recent cases where federal district judges have declined to approve similar 
enforcement proposals. Part II situates this recent judicial skepticism in a more 
familiar framework, arguing that these district judges are engaging in something 
akin to “hard look” review. Part III then encourages a different approach. After 
contrasting the disparate frameworks used by the district and circuit courts in 
Citigroup, Part III suggests that an optimal approach may lie somewhere in the 
middle—a place where courts can still police proposed enforcement decrees for 
 8. See, e.g., Randolph, 736 F.2d at 530 (holding that the district court abused its 
discretion by rejecting a proposed enforcement decree); Brief of Better Markets, 
Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Pro Bono Counsel Appointed to Advocate for 
Affirmance of the District Court’s Order, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 
752 F.3d 285 (2d. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-5227, 11-5375, 11-5242), 2012 WL 6965610, at *3 
n.3 (observing that Randolph—now thirty years old—may be the most recent 
prior example of a circuit court reversing a district court for declining to approve 
an SEC enforcement decree and estimating that “99.9% of such proposed 
settlements are approved routinely if not perfunctorily”); cf. United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding under the antitrust-
specific framework for review set out in the Tunney Act, see supra, note 6, that the 
district court abused its discretion by rejecting a proposed enforcement decree). 
 9. See, e.g., SEC v. Van Gilder, No. 12-CV-02839, 2014 WL 1628474, at *4 (D. Colo. 
Apr. 24, 2014); SEC v. Hohol, No. 14-C-41, 2014 WL 461217, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 
2014); SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (Citigroup I). 
 10. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 294-97 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(Citigroup II); see also Note, supra note 6, at 1292 (observing that the Second 
Circuit’s standard “starkly diverges from [decades of] established practice” in 
judicial review of enforcement decrees). 
 11. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 328. 
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substantive unreasonableness at the margins while assuring that judges give sig-
nificant deference to agencies’ discretionary decisions to settle enforcement ac-
tions on particular terms. 
 
I. Judicial Skepticism of Agency Enforcement Decrees 
 
A. Consent Decrees in Federal Law Enforcement 
 
Consent decrees have a long history in federal civil law enforcement. For 
more than a century, the Department of Justice has utilized consent decrees to 
remedy alleged violations of federal antitrust law.12 And over time these decrees 
have appeared with greater frequency in many other spheres of federal civil law 
enforcement: environmental regulation,13 civil rights enforcement,14 and finan-
cial regulation,15 to name a few. In each arena the federal government often 
brings suit against alleged lawbreakers, only then to enter a negotiated resolu-
tion instead of fully litigating the merits. 
Why have federal regulators come to use these decrees with such frequency? 
For starters, consent decrees carry many familiar benefits that accompany all 
manner of pretrial settlements: by entering an agreement instead of proceeding 
to trial, litigants can conserve financial resources and avoid the risk of an ad-
verse judgment on the merits. When it comes to enforcement actions, settle-
ment allows agencies to spread their limited resources more broadly and prose-
cute more violations of law than would otherwise be possible if every case were 
litigated to judgment.16 Settlement carries benefits for regulated parties, too, al-
lowing them to avoid the publicity of trial and the risk of a costly and stigmatiz-
ing adverse judgment—one that, in some cases, might also carry collateral res 
judicata consequences in subsequent private suits.17 
 12. See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 13884 (N.D. Cal. 
June 1, 1906); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 109 (1932). These decrees 
are “much more the rule than the exception,” resolving the great majority of civil 
complaints brought by the DOJ’s Antitrust Division. Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust 
and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, ANTITRUST, Fall 1995, at 4. 
 13. See Percival, supra note 1, at 328. 
 14. See generally Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police 
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2015); Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by 
Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated 
Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887. 
 15. See Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
1188, 1192 (1975). 
 16. See, e.g., SEC v. Everest Mgmt. Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972) (observing 
that the agency “can bring the large number of enforcement actions it does only 
because in all but a few cases consent decrees are entered”). 
 17. See Lynndon Groff, Is Too Big to Fail Too Big to Confess?: Scrutinizing the SEC’s 
“No-Admit” Consent Judgment Proposals, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1727, 1734-35 (2013). 
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But consent decrees are different from out-of-court settlements. Most im-
portantly, a consent decree is not a mere contract between litigants—it is a 
court order. This yields an important enforcement benefit for the prosecuting 
agency: unlike an out-of-court settlement, a consent decree is backed by the 
court’s contempt power.18 The looming threat of the contempt sanction—what 
with its “stigmatizing effect,” which litigants are often “anxious to avoid,” not 
to mention the movant’s freedom to seek a “broader range” of potential mone-
tary recoveries than it normally could in a contract action—deters downstream 
disobedience by the regulated party.19 And if a defendant strays from the 
agreement, the agency has a swift and effective enforcement mechanism at its 
fingertips: it can simply return to court, without filing a new suit, and request 
judicial enforcement of the prior order.20 By contrast, a party seeking to enforce 
an out-of-court settlement must initiate a new lawsuit—a process that is often 
lengthier and more expensive than requesting sanctions in an ongoing proceed-
ing.21 Beyond these enforcement advantages, consent decrees might carry opti-
cal or political benefits, too.  By obtaining judicial approval and memorializing 
its enforcement agreement in a public proceeding visible to all, the agency can 
enjoy the cost-saving benefits of pretrial settlement while still projecting to the 
public that the agency is abiding by its law-enforcement duties and using the 
courts to vindicate the public interest.22 
 
B. Rakoff’s Revolution: Citigroup I 
 
Yet while agencies and regulated parties have many reasons to opt for a ne-
gotiated resolution instead of proceeding to trial, in recent years several jurists 
have pushed back against the notion that this approach—one of law enforce-
ment by consent—carries commensurate benefits for the public.23 And while 
 18. See DiSarro, supra note 5, at 279-85. 
 19. See id. (suggesting that parties entering into a consent decree might “take 
precautions to ensure that their settlement obligations are performed” and 
“perform tasks that arguably are not even required out of an abundance of 
caution”); Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without 
Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 291, 292 (1988) (“Greater compliance may result because a 
court can hold a party in contempt if it fails to live up to the terms of a consent 
decree, but cannot do so if a party breaches the terms of a private agreement.”). 
 20. DiSarro, supra note 5, at 283. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 289-93 (explaining how a consent decree, unlike a private settlement, is a 
public document); Groff, supra note 17, at 1734 (noting that the SEC can still “tout 
a consent judgment as a political victory by exacting at least some form of 
penalty”). 
 23. Judges and commentators have long raised similar questions in the related context 
of rulemaking settlement. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 
1117, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (decrying the “evil[s] of 
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several district courts have rejected proposed enforcement decrees in recent 
years, one such decision has had the greatest impact on how agencies, regulated 
parties, and courts now view agency enforcement settlements. In 2011, U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Jed Rakoff rejected a proposed settlement between the SEC and 
Citigroup.24 The agency had sued the bank for securities fraud, alleging that in 
the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis Citigroup created a billion-dollar fund 
for the purpose of unloading shaky mortgage-backed securities on unwitting 
investors.25 According to the complaint, Citigroup misrepresented the safety 
and quality of the assets in the fund, resulting in a $160 million gain for the 
bank and a $700 million loss for investors.26 This, the SEC alleged, amounted to 
a negligent violation of the Securities Act of 1933.27 
The agency never planned to bring the case to trial. In fact, the parties 
reached an agreement before the suit was even filed.28 Alongside the complaint, 
the SEC lodged a proposed consent judgment that would (1) permanently en-
join the bank from further violations of the Act, (2) require disgorgement of the 
$160 million Citigroup earned from the sale, (3) assess a $95 million civil penal-
ty, and (4) mandate that, for three years, the bank implement new internal pro-
cedures to ensure that illegal activity would not recur.29 
Judge Rakoff rejected the proposal, reasoning that the parties had failed to 
provide him “with any proven or admitted facts upon which to exercise even a 
modest degree of independent judgment.”30 The parties’ thin submissions—a 
proposed settlement submitted alongside a complaint alleging securities fraud 
in relatively general terms—left Judge Rakoff unsatisfied that, under a widely 
cited standard for reviewing proposed enforcement decrees, the agreement was 
“fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.”31 
For Judge Rakoff, this dearth of information proved problematic in several 
respects. For starters, the parties did not provide adequate evidence to persuade 
government by consent decree,” chief among them “its potential to freeze the 
regulatory processes of representative democracy”); Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 
51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1016, 1025-32 (2001) (arguing that when it comes to rulemaking 
settlement, agencies face “strong incentives to ignore the interests of important 
stakeholders—principals who otherwise would be afforded procedural 
protections—presenting a principal-agent gap”). 
 24. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
 25. See id. at 329. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 330.  
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
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him that the requested injunction was in the public interest.32 He was thus un-
willing to invoke the court’s equitable powers to order a prophylactic change in 
corporate policy. His reasoning rested on the differing levels of judicial in-
volvement required for private settlements and agency enforcement decrees: 
Purely private parties can settle a case without ever agreeing on the 
facts, for all that is required is that a plaintiff dismiss his complaint. But 
when a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement 
by imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a defendant, en-
forced by the formidable judicial power of contempt, the court, and the 
public, need some knowledge of what the underlying facts are: for oth-
erwise, the court becomes a mere handmaiden to a settlement privately 
negotiated on the basis of unknown facts, while the public is deprived 
of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public importance.33 
Judge Rakoff also took issue with the SEC’s choice to charge Citigroup only 
with negligence. In a parallel complaint filed the same day against a Citigroup 
employee, the SEC suggested that the bank knowingly misrepresented the safety 
of its assets to potential investors.34 “Although [the accusations in the parallel 
complaint] would appear to be tantamount to an allegation of knowing and 
fraudulent intent,” Judge Rakoff remarked, “the S.E.C., for reasons of its own, 
chose to charge Citigroup only with negligence.”35 
Finally, Judge Rakoff criticized the settlement agreement for not requiring 
the bank to admit wrongdoing.36 He noted that this was a common feature of 
SEC enforcement settlements, “hallowed by history, but not by reason.”37 Judge 
Rakoff explained that this combination of agency enforcement choices dealt a 
“double blow” to would-be civil plaintiffs seeking to recoup their losses from 
Citigroup: private litigants cannot bring securities claims based on negligence, 
and the consent decree (lacking any admission from the bank) would carry no 
collateral estoppel effect for individual plaintiffs. So the SEC’s four-year investi-
 32. See id. at 331 (citing eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to 
well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent 
injunction . . . must demonstrate . . . that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.”)); see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity 
should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the 
extraordinary remedy of injunction.”). 
 33. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (footnote omitted). 
 34. See Complaint at 10, SEC v. Stoker,  2011 WL 4965844 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011) (No. 
11-CV-7388). 
 35. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333. 
 36. Id. at 332-33. 
 37. Id. at 332. 
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gation culminated in a proposal that did nothing to facilitate private litigation.38 
To Judge Rakoff, the SEC’s failure to obtain an admission of liability contra-
dicted the agency’s stated belief—which it had reaffirmed before Judge Rakoff 
at oral argument—that private parties serve an integral role in securities law en-
forcement.39 
Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the SEC/Citigroup deal jolted the financial sec-
tor, setting off a wave of unease among regulators and regulated parties alike.40 
The SEC’s Director of Enforcement protested that the decision, by “ignor[ing] 
decades of established practice throughout federal agencies and decisions of the 
federal courts,” would frustrate the Commission’s regulatory mission.41 Mem-
bers of the business community decried the ruling as impinging on corporate 
defendants’ ability to settle charges without admitting liabilitya strategic 
business choice that allows corporations to manage defense costs, retain insur-
ance coverage, and preserve the ability to “attract and retain qualified directors 
and officers, access to the capital markets, and other ongoing business decisions 
that are exogenous to the matter being settled.”42 Meanwhile consumer advo-
cates and commentators, long skeptical about the “cozy nexus” between regula-
tors and big banks, championed Judge Rakoff’s decision as a long-overdue dose 
of judicial oversight for an agency incapable of effectively regulating the bank-
ing industry.43 
 38. See id. at 334; see also Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (“[A] consent judgment between a federal agency and a private 
corporation which is not the result of an actual adjudication of any of the 
issues . . . [cannot] be used as evidence in subsequent litigation.”). 
 39. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334. 
 40. See Edward Wyatt, Congress to Examine S.E.C. Settlement Policy, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Dec. 16, 2011, 8:27 PM), http://www.dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/ 
congress-to-hold-hearings-on-s-e-c-settlement-practices/; Jean Eaglesham & Chad 
Bray, Citi Ruling Could Chill SEC, Street Legal Pacts, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29. 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203935604577066242448635560. 
 41. Eaglesham & Bray, supra note 40. 
 42. Brief for Business Roundtable As Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5, SEC 
v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227). 
 43. Brief for Securities Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting District Court at 
14, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 2013 WL 460424 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-
5227); see Brief of Occupy Wall Street—Alternative Banking Group as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting The Public Interest and Against Appellant and Appellee, SEC v. 
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 2012 WL 2131928 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-5227, 11-
5375, 11-5242); Groff, supra note 17, at, 1728; Joe Palazzolo, Law Professors Jump in 
Rakoff’s Corner, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2012, 9:54 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/08/17/law-professon&-jump-in-rakoffs-corner/; 
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The SEC and Citigroup jointly appealed Judge Rakoff’s order, arguing that 
the district court had abused its discretion in rejecting the proposal. The Second 
Circuit stayed the order pending appeal, finding the appellants were likely to 
succeed in their challenge.44 That prediction was correct. 
 
C. The Second Circuit Cuts Back: Citigroup II 
 
The Second Circuit rejected Judge Rakoff’s approach for reviewing pro-
posed enforcement decrees.45 While acknowledging that federal courts cannot 
simply rubber-stamp a stipulated request for injunctive relief, the panel held 
that a reviewing court’s role is mostly limited to seeing that a proposed decree is 
“procedurally proper.”46 Setting out a new framework, the Second Circuit held 
that a district court is required to approve a proposed enforcement decree un-
less there is “a substantial basis in the record” for concluding that the proposal 
(1) is not fair, (2) is not reasonable, or (3) would disserve the public interest.47 
The panel further held that courts must give “significant” deference to an agen-
cy’s assessment that a proposed decree serves the public interest.48 That deter-
mination, the court emphasized, “rests squarely with the S.E.C.”49 
This standard boasts four distinct features, each marking a change from the 
district court’s more searching approach. First, it places an onus on district 
courts to ferret out any reasons for rejection: “Absent a substantial basis in the 
record” for finding that the proposed decree is unfair, is unreasonable, or would 
disserve the public interest, “the district court is required” to approve the de-
cree.50 Given that the average district court docket is busy enough with disputed 
motions between adversaries, and considering that the agency has no incentive 
to flag any shortcomings or flaws in the proposed decree, this burden heightens 
 44. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 45. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 285. 
 46. Id. at 294. 
 47. Id. The panel explained that the third requirement is applicable only to consent 
decrees involving injunctive relief. See id. For practical purposes, we can assume 
that most (if not all) proposed enforcement decrees will involve some measure of 
injunctive relief—even if only a provision enjoining the defendant from further 
violations of the law. Cf. Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The 
consent decree is an injunction. A judgment issued by a court in the exercise of its 
equitable or admiralty jurisdiction is called a decree, and when a decree 
commands or prohibits conduct, it is called an injunction.”). 
 48. Citigroup II,  752 F.3d at 296. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 294 (emphasis added). 
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an already-strong presumption that the district court will approve the pro-
posal.51 
Second, the standard makes clear that courts should focus generally on 
procedure, not substance, when assessing whether a proposed decree is “fair” 
and “reasonable.” The panel directed courts to weigh fairness and reasonable-
ness by considering several procedural factors: (a) the “basic legality of the de-
cree,” (b) whether the decree’s “terms . . . are clear,” (c) whether the decree “re-
flects a resolution of the actual claims in the complaint,” and (d) whether the 
decree “is tainted by improper collusion or corruption of some kind.”52 Though 
reviewing courts can look to other factors, too, the Second Circuit explained 
that the “primary focus . . . should be on ensuring the consent decree is proce-
durally proper, using [similarly] objective measures.”53 An emphasis on proce-
dure will, the panel suggested, help ensure that reviewing courts “take[] care 
not to infringe on the S.E.C.’s discretionary authority to settle on a particular 
set of terms.”54 
Third, the standard omits “adequacy” from the inquiry altogether. Accord-
ing to the Second Circuit, asking whether a proposed agreement is “adequate” 
only makes sense in the context of class action settlements that would bar future 
claims by individual plaintiffs.55 In those cases, where numerous third parties 
are bound by the decree, a court should “rightly be concerned that the settle-
ment be adequate.”56 The panel reasoned that an SEC enforcement decree does 
not raise the same worries: 
[I]f there are potential plaintiffs with a private right of action, those 
plaintiffs are free to bring their own actions. If there is no private right 
of action, then the S.E.C. is the entity charged with representing the 
victims, and is politically liable if it fails to adequately perform its du-
ties.57 
This approach is novel. By eschewing adequacy entirely, the Second Circuit is at 
odds not only with Judge Rakoff and his more skeptical colleagues, but also 
with every other federal court to have considered the standard of review for 
agency enforcement decrees in the last several decades.58 
 51. See, e.g., SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Unless a consent 
decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 52. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 294-95. 
 53. Id. at 295. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 294. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See supra note 7.  
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Finally, though a consent decree must not disserve the public interest, the 
Second Circuit’s approach ensures that the judiciary will normally have little 
input on that score. The court emphasized that “[t]he job of determining 
whether the proposed S.E.C. consent decree best serves the public interest . . . 
rests squarely with the S.E.C., and its decision merits significant deference.”59 
The panel did not explain what “significant deference” might look like. It did, 
however, offer one example of a rare consent decree that would disserve the 
public interest—one that “barred private litigants from pursuing their own 
claims independent of the relief obtained under the consent decree.”60 By con-
trast, the panel explained that a court cannot find the public interest disserved 
just because the court disagrees with an agency’s decision “on discretionary 
matters of policy, such as deciding to settle without requiring an admission of 
liability.”61 
 
D. Additional Judicial Skepticism of Agency Enforcement Decrees 
 
While Citigroup II bars Judge Rakoff and his colleagues in the Second Cir-
cuit from undertaking a thorough substantive review of proposed enforcement 
decrees, it does not, of course, similarly bind district judges in other circuits. 
This matters because several judges across the country, some explicitly taking a 
cue from Judge Rakoff, have declined to approve agency enforcement decrees in 
recent years. 
One example is Judge John Kane of the District of Colorado. In a recent 
SEC enforcement action against an individual accused of insider trading, it took 
the agency three tries to come up with a consent decree that Judge Kane was 
willing to approve.62 To Judge Kane, the parties’ initial submissions suffered 
several flaws. First, the parties asked the court to enter judgment without first 
issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Judge Kane’s view, such a 
waiver would contravene Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 and undermine an 
 59. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 296. The panel proceeded to invoke Chevron’s principle of 
deference to the political branches: “[F]ederal judges—who have no 
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who 
do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and 
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not 
judicial ones . . . .” Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)). Though the court did not explain what “significant” 
deference looks like, its allusion to Chevron suggests that courts are powerless to 
second-guess an agency’s reasonable view that a proposed decree doesn’t disserve 
the public interest. 
 60. Id. at 297. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Final Judgment, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law as to Defendant 
Michael Van Gilder and Relief Defendant Stephen Diltz, SEC v. Van Gilder, No. 
12-CV-02839 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2014) (approving the SEC’s third unopposed 
motion for judgment). 
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important reason for findings of fact: “that trial courts are public institutions 
with a duty to make their decisions available so the public can be informed.”63 
Second, the parties sought to waive any right to appeal the decree. Acknowledg-
ing that litigants are always entitled to forge an out-of-court agreement dismiss-
ing their case and promising not to seek review, Judge Kane held that “a public 
agency [asking] a court to maintain continuing jurisdiction over its enforce-
ment action has no such license or authority.”64 Third, tipping his hat to Judge 
Rakoff, Judge Kane criticized the defendant’s unwillingness to admit any 
wrongdoing.65 Finally, he took issue with the parties’ request for a meager in-
junction that would only bar the defendant from further violations.66 To Judge 
Kane, such an order would be “oxymoronic” and “gratuitous” because there is 
already an adequate remedy at law: the SEC can lodge additional claims under 
the statute.67 Though Judge Kane had several objections to the proposed decree, 
most of them revolved around one overarching concern: the parties’ failure to 
 63. SEC v. Van Gilder, No. 12-CV-02839, 2014 WL 1628474, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 
2014). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1) provides that “[i]n an action tried 
on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts 
specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” FED. R. CIV. PRO. 52(a)(1).  
The rule does not address whether findings of fact are required before a consent 
decree can issue. Most have taken this to mean that such findings are not needed. 
See, e.g., United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 166 (6th Cir. 1979); 9 JAMES WM. 
MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52.11[2] (3d ed. 2014) (“Factfinding is often 
unnecessary when the judgment does not follow a trial upon the facts, but merely 
incorporates the terms of a consent decree. Findings are not required under these 
circumstances because there has been no trial on the merits, and the parties 
ordinarily cannot attack the decree on appeal.” (footnote omitted)); 9C CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2574 (3d 
ed. 2008) (“[T]he entry of a consent decree or judgment does not require court 
findings under Rule 52(a).”). 
 64. Van Gilder, 2014 WL 1628474, at *2. But cf. United States v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 
1266 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding an abuse of discretion where the district court 
rejected a plea agreement in a criminal case solely because the agreement 
contained an appellate waiver). 
 65. Van Gilder, 2014 WL 1628474, at *2 (citing Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)). Two years earlier, Judge Kane voiced similar criticisms of a 
proposed decree between the SEC and Bridge Premium Finance, a corporation 
accused of defrauding investors in a Ponzi scheme. Because the defendant had 
“remain[ed] defiantly mute as to the veracity” of the SEC’s allegations, Judge Kane 
concluded that the defendant’s options were “binary: he may admit the allegations 
or he may go to trial.” Order Denying Entry of Final Judgments at 1, SEC v. Bridge 
Premium Fin. LLC, No. 1:12-CV-02131-JLK-BNB (D. Colo. Jan. 17, 2013). 
 66. Van Gilder,  2014 WL 1628474, at *3. 
 67. Id. Judge Kane is not alone in questioning the enforceability of injunctions that 
merely require a party to obey the law. See, e.g., SEC v. Smyth,  420 F.3d 1225, 1233 
n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (“This Circuit has held repeatedly that ‘obey the law’ 
injunctions are unenforceable.”). 
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provide the court with a sufficient factual record to enable “independent judg-
ment” of the settlement’s propriety.68 
Judge Richard Leon of the District of Columbia has displayed a similar re-
luctance to approve SEC enforcement decrees. He recently refused to sign off 
on a proposed decree between the SEC and IBM, reasoning that the agency 
failed to secure adequate injunctive relief in a civil suit alleging the company vi-
olated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by bribing foreign officials in 
order to secure government contracts.69 Like in Citigroup I, the SEC submitted 
a proposed decree that would require disgorgement, a civil penalty, and an in-
junction barring the corporation from further violations of the law. But Judge 
Leon wanted more. Due to IBM’s documented history of FCPA violations, he 
decided the decree should also require that the company alert both the agency 
and the court whenever it learns of a reasonable likelihood that its employees 
have committed further FCPA infractions.70 IBM refused, claiming the re-
quirement would be “too burdensome.”71 So Judge Leon rejected the proposed 
decree. “I’m not just going to roll over like the S.E.C. has,” he told IBM, ex-
plaining he would “need data” before being satisfied that additional reporting 
obligations would truly be too burdensome.72 Observing that he was one of “a 
growing number of [d]istrict judges in the country who have grown increasing-
ly concerned” about “simply signing off on consent decrees,” Judge Leon em-
phasized that it was his responsibility to see that the proposal served the public 
interest.73 “I guess you want that $10 million judgment on your list of achieve-
ments this year,” he told the SEC during an approval hearing.74 “Well, it’s not 
going to happen.”75 
Judges Rakoff, Kane, and Leon aren’t alone. Other federal district judges 
have similarly pushed back against proposed enforcement decrees, either de-
manding more information from the parties or declining to approve the decrees 
 68. Van Gilder,  2014 WL 1628474, at *3. 
 69. Transcript of Dec. 20, 2012 Status Conference at 9,  SEC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 
No. 1:11-CV-00563-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2013); Complaint, SEC v. Int’l Bus. 
Machs. Corp., No. 1:11-CV-00563-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011). 
 70. Transcript of Dec. 20, 2012 Status Conference at 4-5, SEC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., No. 1:11-CV-00563-RJL (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2013). 
 71. Id. at 16. 
 72. Id. at 9; see also id. at 18 (“Now, you are not going to just stand before this Court 
and make summary conclusory statements . . . . You are going to need affidavits 
from accountants who might have to sit in that chair right there under oath and 
satisfy this Court that it would be too burdensome.”). 
 73. Id. at 9, 20. 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. Id. 
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altogether.76 To be sure, not every rejection is based on identical reasons—
Judges Rakoff, Kane, and Leon expressed varied concerns in the cases described 
above. But this judicial pushback shares a unifying theme: in each case, the un-
derlying record lacked sufficient information (in the court’s view) to support a 
finding that the proposed decree was reasonable, adequate, and fair.77 Though 
Citigroup II will likely curb this sort of pushback within the Second Circuit, and 
while that decision may also influence how judges in other circuits deal with 
these enforcement proposals going forward, it is clear that Judge Rakoff’s ap-
proach has had ripple effects on courts and regulators alike.78 
 76. See SEC v. Hohol, No. 2:14-CV-00041-RTR, 2014 WL 461217, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 
5, 2014) (rejecting a set of proposed consent decrees and ordering the SEC to 
“provide a written factual predicate for why it believes the Court should find that 
the proposed final judgments are fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public 
interest”); SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC, 939 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (rejecting a “minimalist conception” of “the judiciary’s function in passing 
upon these settlements as illusory, as a predetermined rubber stamp for any 
settlement put before it by an administrative agency, or even a prosecutor”); FTC 
v. Circa Direct LLC, No. 1:11-CV-02172-RMB-AMD, 2012 WL 2178705, at *7 (D.N.J. 
June 13, 2012) (requesting a second round of supplemental briefing from the FTC 
to address how, despite the agency’s failure to obtain an admission of liability, the 
proposed consent decree serves the public interest); Letter from Hon. Rudolph T. 
Randa, U.S. Dist. Court Judge, to Andrea R. Wood & James A. Davidson, SEC 
(Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.wlrk.com/docs/kossletter.pdf (“The Court requests 
that the SEC provide a written factual predicate for why it believes the Court 
should find that the proposed final judgments are fair, reasonable, adequate, and 
in the public interest.” (citing Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
 77. There is another (and even more apparent) theme to this recent judicial pushback: 
it has occurred overwhelmingly in the context of SEC enforcement cases. See supra 
note 76. This suggests numerous district judges are concerned that the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division hasn not been doing its job. See also text accompanying 
notes 111-115, infra. But while this judicial pushback may (currently) be largely 
agency-specific, that does not make this Article’s review-calibration question a 
provincial one. When the Second Circuit used Citigroup II to announce a new 
standard for judicial review of proposed enforcement decrees, it made clear that its 
holding applies to “enforcement agenc[ies]” generally, not just to the agency that 
happened to be before it at the time. See Citigroup II 752 F.3d at 294. Indeed, 
several district courts have since invoked the Citigroup II standard when reviewing 
non-SEC enforcement proposals. See, e.g., CFPB v. Sprint Corp., No. 14CV9931, 
2015 WL 3395581, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2015); United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., No. 14-CV-936 KMK, 2014 WL 3057960, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014). 
 78. See Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, Overruled, Judge Still Left a Mark on S.E.C. 
Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2014, at B1 (explaining that after Citigroup I, the SEC 
“reversed its longstanding yet unofficial policy of allowing companies to neither 
‘admit nor deny wrongdoing,’ signaling that it would force admissions in 
particularly egregious cases”). Professor Jill Fisch predicts that Judge Rakoff’s 
order will have longstanding effects—“[t]he Second Circuit can’t put the genie 
back in the lamp.” Id. Professor John Coffee agrees, claiming that the SEC “will 
not be able to return to its former system of equivocal enforcement without 
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II. Hidden Hard Look Review 
 
Though these recent decisions suggest judicial skepticism of agency en-
forcement decrees is (slowly) on the rise, the theoretical or doctrinal basis for 
this skepticism is unclear. But a closer look reveals that this judicial pushback—
especially as seen in Citigroup I—is strikingly similar to a more well-known 
form of judicial oversight over federal agency decisionmaking: “hard look” re-
view. 
 
A. “Hard Look” Review 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that judges should set 
aside agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”79 
As the Supreme Court explained in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., courts applying APA Section 706(2)(a) 
will find an agency action arbitrary and capricious if the agency has: (1) “relied 
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,” (2) “entirely failed 
to consider an important aspect of the problem,” (3) “offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence,” or (4) “is so implausible that 
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise.”80 This approach, known as “hard look” review, encourages agencies to en-
gage in reasoned decisionmaking.81 To avoid having its decision set aside, an 
agency must explain to a reviewing court how, in light of the available evidence 
and the input of interested parties, it decided to make that decision.82 Though a 
court cannot—in theory, at least—substitute its own judgment for the agency’s 
complex policymaking decisions, the agency “must explain the evidence which 
is available, and must offer a rational connection between the facts found and 
the choice made.”83 
This framework for arbitrary and capricious review emerged in the 1960s 
and 1970s after several federal judges grew concerned that agencies had been 
captured by the industries they were tasked to regulate.84 In an effort to ensure 
that agencies were still fulfilling their statutory obligations, several D.C. Circuit 
incurring the scorn of the press and the public.” Sasha Abramsky, Jed Rakoff and 
the Lonely Fight for Wall Street Justice, NATION (June 14, 2014), http://www 
.thenation.com/article/jed-rakoff-and-lonely-fight-wall-street-justice/.  
 79. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 80. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 81. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 44 (2007). 
 82. Id. 
 83. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 15-16 (2009).  
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judges cultivated a more rigorous approach to applying Section 706(2)(a)—one 
that polices agency action for both procedural and substantive shortcomings.85 
Because it is born from judicial skepticism of agency decisionmaking, hard look 
review recognizes that an agency’s processes are sometimes animated by bu-
reaucratic, political, or resource-driven considerations that are at best irrele-
vant, and at worst contrary, to the particular guidelines enacted by Congress.86 
By forcing the agency to show its work and engage in a decisionmaking process 
that hews to statutory guidelines, hard look review seeks to “guard against pre-
cisely the kinds of infidelities that lie at the core of the agency cost problem in 
administrative law.”87 
Many commentators have accordingly described hard look review as bear-
ing an “information-forcing” effect: it requires the agency to furnish more in-
formation supporting its decision.88 This, in turn, can bring about more delib-
erative and reasoned actions—an attendant “expertise-forcing” effect.89 
Professor Catherine Sharkey suggests that requiring agencies to develop more 
robust records “is desirable to the extent that it is expertise forcing and thus 
leads to better regulatory outcomes, including forcing agencies to look for less 
costly ways to fulfill their statutory mandates.”90 
But all this information and expertise forcing comes at a cost. By prompt-
ing more deliberative decisionmaking (or at least more thorough recordkeep-
 85. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
542 (1985) (explaining how the Supreme Court in State Farm “effectively 
adopted . . . [a] substantive” approach to arbitrary and capricious review); 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761, 771 (2008) (explaining that State Farm “endorse[s] both 
procedural and substantive aspects of the hard look doctrine”). 
 86. See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
899, 944-45 (1996); Watts, supra note 84, at 15-16; see also Adam S. Zimmerman, 
Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 570 (2011) (“Hard look review . . . 
recognizes that agencies will not always vigorously represent the interests of 
victims in a settlement.”). 
 87. Nagareda, supra note 86, at 945. 
 88. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial 
Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1605 (2014) 
[hereinafter State Farm “With Teeth”]; Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in 
American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 
1859 (2012); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” 
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 754 (2006); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2181 
(2009) (explaining that hard look review serves as a tool “to ensure that agencies 
disclose relevant data and provide reasoned responses to material objections raised 
during the rulemaking process”). 
 89. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 88, at 1605; see also Garland, supra 
note 85, at 542; Miles & Sunstein, supra note 85, at 771. 
 90. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 88, at 1605. 
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ing), hard look review generally hampers the pace and flexibility of an agency’s 
regulatory choices.91 Following State Farm, a common behavioral pattern 
emerged: agencies often documented their decisionmaking processes more 
thoroughly.92 Many commentators believe this made regulatory action more 
expensive.93 
Hard look review might in practice carry other, more insidious, problems. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s caution in State Farm that a reviewing court can-
not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency,”94 one study suggests that 
judicial policy preferences sometimes play a significant role in hard look re-
view.95 Noting that hard look review was not intended to allow federal judges 
“to impose their own policy preferences on the administrative state,” Professors 
Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein studied a cross-section of cases examining Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and Environmental Protection Agency actions 
over a ten-year span.96 Their findings identified a “strong possibility that in 
 91. See Stephenson, supra note 88, at 766-77; Miles & Sunstein, supra note 85, at 809 
(“[J]udicial review increases the costs of decisions, simply because it adds an 
additional layer, and possibly more than that, of decisional burdens on all sides.”). 
 92. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 156 (2012); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 135, 164-165 (2010) (claiming that State Farm’s “bite lies in its requirement 
that agencies explain themselves”). 
 93. See Seidenfeld, supra note 92, at 156 (“As numerous articles have noted, hard-look 
review increases an agency’s cost of adopting a rule and slows down the agency 
decision-making process, sometimes quite markedly.”); Stephenson, supra note 
88, at 764-65 (describing cost-based critiques of hard look review). 
 94. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971) (“The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.”). 
 95. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 85, at 768. 
 96. Id. at 762, 766; see also Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial 
Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1999) (describing hard look review 
as an “aggrandizing” doctrine); Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 422 (2009) (“[A]dministrative law 
doctrines for judicial review of agency rulemaking have become a judicially 
created obstacle course that gives judges far too much leeway to reach results 
based on their partisan policy preferences.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental 
Regulations, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1237, 1264 (2002) (observing “a powerful tendency 
for judges to act in accordance with their partisan political preferences when they 
apply [hard look review] to the EPA’s actions”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative 
Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1120 (1995) (“State 
Farm transformed a weak, determinate doctrine into a doctrine so indeterminate 
that any judge could manipulate it to obtain her preferred outcome”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 7 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 53 (1984) (“Most crudely, [the hard look doctrine] can 
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many cases, judges are voting to invalidate agency decisions as arbitrary when 
they would not do so if their own predilections were otherwise.”97 And if that 
claim is correct, the hard look framework, which was designed “to police agency 
decisions for genuine arbitrariness,” is not working as it should.98 
 
B. Citigroup I: Taking a “Hard Look” at Proposed Enforcement Decrees 
 
Although Judge Rakoff’s Citigroup I order does not explicitly allude to hard 
look review, it embodies the same information-forcing spirit and echoes many 
common concerns present in typical Section 706 cases. 
Information forcing. In rejecting the proposed enforcement decree, Judge 
Rakoff explained that the “[m]ost fundamental[]” problem with the proposal 
was its slender evidentiary foundation.99 This shortcoming informed every step 
of the court’s analysis: the proposal was deemed unreasonable because “[it can-
not] ever be reasonable to impose substantial relief on the basis of mere allega-
tions”; it was judged unfair because of the “potential for abuse” that accompa-
nies the imposition of penalties “on the basis of facts that are neither proven 
nor acknowledged”; it was ruled inadequate because the court “lack[ed] a 
framework for determining adequacy”; and the proposal was found not to serve 
the public interest “because it ask[ed] the Court to employ its power and assert 
its authority” without “know[ing] the facts.”100 By rejecting the proposal, Judge 
Rakoff engaged in an especially robust degree of information forcing: if the SEC 
wants a judicially enforceable settlement, it must show why the decree is justi-
fied—possibly even by procuring an admission of liability from the defendant. 
Reliance on extra-statutory factors and infidelity to the statutory mandate. 
Judge Rakoff voiced skepticism that the SEC’s actions aligned with its statutory 
mandate. Remarking that it was difficult to “discern . . . what the S.E.C. is get-
ting from this settlement other than a quick headline,” Judge Rakoff questioned 
whether the decree, which promised no restitution to defrauded victims, could 
support the agency’s claimed “devot[ion] . . . to the protection of investors.” 101 
He also emphasized the SEC’s duty, “inherent in its statutory mission, to see 
that the truth emerges.”102 In Judge Rakoff’s eyes, the SEC failed to live up to 
be a device for the achievement of straightforwardly ‘political’ ends—either to 
prevent regulation, or to promote it.”). 
 97. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 85, at 810. 
 98. Id. at 762; see also id. at 768 (“[I]f Democratic appointees are especially inclined to 
find conservative decisions to be arbitrary, and if Republican appointees are 
especially likely to find liberal decisions to be arbitrary, something is seriously 
amiss.”). 
 99. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332. 
 100. Id. at 335. 
 101. Id. at 333-34. 
 102. Id. at 335. 
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this obligation, leaving the “truth” behind its investigation obscured. His order 
also insinuated that the agency relied on factors Congress had not intended it to 
considerthe quick publicity benefit of a $285 million win and the relative ease 
of obtaining a settlement instead of proceeding to trial against a well-lawyered 
global bank.103 
Failure to account for the evidence before the agency. Hard look review also 
looks askance at decisions that “run counter to the evidence before the agen-
cy,”104 and in Judge Rakoff’s view the SEC’s enforcement choices were incon-
sistent with the evidence before it.105 Throughout the order, he emphasized that 
the SEC chose “only” to charge Citigroup with negligence, despite the agency’s 
suggestions in a parallel complaint that the corporation had acted knowingly in 
misrepresenting the safety of its securities.106 He also expressed doubt as to the 
deterrent value of the proposed sanctions, stating that the $95 million penalty 
was mere “pocket change” to a “recidivist” Securities Act violator like 
Citigroup.107 
Failure to consider an important aspect of the problem. By casting doubt on 
the agency’s refusal to pursue more serious charges or secure an admission of 
liability, Citigroup I could be read as finding that the SEC failed to consider al-
ternative courses of action. Or that the agency failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem108its obligation to, “in any case like this that touches on 
the transparency of financial markets whose gyrations have so depressed our 
economy and debilitated our lives,” account for the public’s “overriding” inter-
est in knowing the truth about Citigroup’s alleged misdeeds.109 
Potential substitution of a reviewing judge’s policy views. If we accept the 
Miles/Sunstein theory that hard look review sometimes allows judges to substi-
tute their policy views for those of the agency—despite State Farm’s contrary 
admonition—then Citigroup I perhaps parallels the hard look framework in 
that respect, too. After all, hard look review came about at a time when numer-
ous federal judges were concerned that federal agencies had become captured 
by the very industries they were tasked to regulate.110 And Judge Rakoff, a for-
 103. Id. at 333-34; see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (observing that an agency action will 
“normally” fail judicial review “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress 
has not intended it to consider”). 
 104. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 105. Citigroup I, 827 F.Supp. 2d at 333. 
 106. Id. at 330, 333-34. 
 107. Id. at 333-34. 
 108. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (explaining that an agency action would 
“[n]ormally” fail judicial review if the agency “entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem”). 
 109. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87. 
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mer federal prosecutor with experience prosecuting financial crimes in the 
Southern District of New York, has made clear his views that the federal gov-
ernment has failed sufficiently to police and punish financial industry malfea-
sance in the wake of the Great Recession.111 Perhaps these views informed his 
decision to reject the proposal in Citigroup I.112 For example, he took the SEC to 
task for its policy of settling enforcement actions without requiring the defend-
ant to admit any wrongdoing.113 That policy is surely controversial, but is it en-
tirely unreasonable?114 As Judge Rakoff acknowledged, an admission of liability 
in a case like Citigroup I would open the door to private lawsuits seeking collat-
eral estoppel benefit from the company’s admission.115 The SEC may well want 
to help private litigants by procuring such concessions, but surely some defend-
ants would simply refuse to settle on those terms. 
Perhaps hard look review was not meant to allow judges to engage in policy 
policing of this sort. After all, State Farm described arbitrary and capricious re-
view as a “narrow” inquiry—one that precludes a court from “substitut[ing] its 
judgment for that of the agency.”116 But at the same time, as Professor Sharkey 
observes, in State Farm itself the Supreme Court “enthusiastically mines the 
agency record on its own and is hardly deferential at all.”117 Courts and com-
 111. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (positing that if the 
2008 financial crisis was in part the result of intentional fraud, “the failure to 
prosecute those responsible must be judged one of the more egregious failures of 
the criminal justice system in many years”). 
 112. Certain of Judge Rakoff’s public statements in recent years seem to suggest as 
much. See Abramsky, supra note 78 (in which Judge Rakoff comments that 
agencies are “too cozy” with regulated parties and that “in a society in which the 
regulatory agencies play such a huge role, there is a need for greater review and 
greater oversight than currently exists”). 
 113. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332. 
 114. See Priyah Kaul, Admit or Deny: A Call for Reform of the SEC’s “Neither-Admit-
Nor-Deny” Policy, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 535, 542 (2015); Groff, supra note 17; 
Andrew Ackerman, SEC’s Khuzami Defends “Admit Nor Deny” Settlements, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702040120045770 
72462404708198; Eaglesham & Bray, supra note 40; Edward Wyatt, Congress to 
Examine S.E.C. Settlement Policy, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.dealbook.nytimes .com/2011/12/16/congress-to-hold-hearings-on-s-e-c-
settlement-practices/. 
 115. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334. 
 116. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 462 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 117. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 88, at 1611; see also id. (“Does State 
Farm itself support a more demanding ‘State Farm with teeth’ standard? The 
Court’s language would seem to say ‘no’; whereas the Court’s actions—at least 
with respect to finding NHTSA’s view of automatic seatbelts arbitrary and 
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mentators alike have puzzled over these mixed signals, wondering how deferen-
tial courts should be when examining agency decisionmaking for arbitrariness. 
Some view State Farm as “provid[ing] a light guiding hand, blocking only the 
most illegitimate or irrational agency actions.”118 Others think it plays a more 
rigorous role in practice, “[n]otwithstanding the Court’s aspirations.”119 But re-
gardless of who is correct in theory, there is evidence on the ground that—in 
some cases, at least—hard look review leaves space for judges to displace rea-
sonable (if debatable) agency policy decisions. And in this way, too, Judge 
Rakoff’s order fits the bill, offering another example of the spirit of hard look 
review permeating judicial skepticism of agency enforcement decrees. 
 
III. Calibrating the Optimal Approach 
 
This final Part proceeds with three aims. First, it argues that a rigorous hard 
look approach is too burdensome for ex ante review of all proposed agency en-
forcement decrees. Second, it explains how the Second Circuit’s response in 
Citigroup II marked too strong a swing in the other direction, all but guarantee-
ing that nearly any proposed enforcement decree will earn judicial approval. 
Third, it suggests that an optimal level of deference lies somewhere in the mid-
dle—a place where courts can still police proposed enforcement decrees for 
substantive unreasonableness while minimizing the chance that judges will dis-
place agency decisions that conflict with their policy preferences. 
 
A. Citigroup I: How the Court Went Too Far 
 
Courts should not apply Citigroup I’s more searching brand of review to 
proposed agency enforcement decrees. For starters, the APA appears not to au-
thorize ex ante review of such decrees. To be sure, the absence of an enabling 
statute does not bar review outright—at least not in the consent decree context, 
where courts have an independent obligation to assure themselves that the judi-
cial power should be invoked—but it still suggests that full-blown arbitrary and 
capricious review, which grew out of Section 706 of the APA, is not proper here. 
Second, Citigroup I demonstrates that hard look review might allow judges to 
displace an agency’s reasonable policymaking decisions based on their own pol-
icy views. Third, if courts invoke hard look review to ask whether the agency 
properly weighed the evidence and considered alternative courses in pursuing 
the enforcement action, they run the risk of second-guessing an agency’s discre-
capricious in light of the Court’s probe of the underlying empirical evidence—
suggest ‘yes.’”). 
 118. Id. at 1607; see also, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 
156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing arbitrary and capricious review as “highly 
deferential”). 
 119. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 85, at 782. 
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tionary prosecutorial choices to bring certain charges instead of others. And 
decades of case law strongly suggests that is not allowed. 
The APA appears not to authorize judicial review of proposed agency en-
forcement decrees. That’s because an agency’s request for a consent judgment is 
likely not, as the Act requires, “final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in court.”120 It is merely a proposal—a request, supported by 
written argument, for judicial action. Of course, this does not mean that courts 
are powerless to review proposed enforcement decrees.121 Just the opposite—
courts have an obligation, separate and apart from anything the APA might 
provide, to assure themselves that the decree “is consistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws, does not undermine the rightful interests of third parties, and is 
an appropriate commitment of the court’s limited resources.”122 Still, this 
should tell us something. Because hard look review is merely a judicial “gloss” 
on Section 706,123 and because that statute likely doesn’t apply here, perhaps the 
 120.  5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); see Rossi, supra note 23, at 1056 (“The APA does not 
expressly provide for ex ante review of settlements and their terms outside of the 
context of judicial stays, suggesting that the textual support for such review is 
shaky.” (citation omitted)). Neither, in most cases, is a proposed consent decree 
“[a]gency action made reviewable by statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. But see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 16(e)(1) (2012) (providing a framework for judicial review of antitrust consent 
decrees). Some courts have even held that, “final[ity]” of the parties’ proposal 
aside, see 5. U.S.C. § 704, the entry of a consent decree is not “agency action” to 
begin with. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’ns of N. Cal. v. Norton, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1, 
5 (D.D.C. 2002) (observing that because a consent decree “is not only a contract 
between the parties to the decree, but . . . also a ‘judicial act’ . . . adoption of a 
consent decree is not an agency act under the APA” (citation omitted)); Turtle 
Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 
1013-14 (D. Hawaii 2011) (same), aff’d, 672 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 121. Final agency enforcement decrees, by contrast, might well be entirely 
unreviewable. According to the D.C. Circuit—the only federal appellate court to 
weigh in on the issue—an agency’s decision to enter into a settlement is 
“committed to agency discretion” and thus insulated from subsequent review 
under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 
(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (holding that an FCC decision to enter into a consent decree was 
unreviewable). It bears emphasizing that these decisions only bar downstream, ex 
post challenges to finalized agency settlements. They do not preclude ex ante 
judicial review of proposed enforcement decrees. 
 122. Kasper v. Chi. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987); see also 
FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) (“When a 
public agency requests that a judicial stamp of approval be placed on a negotiated 
consent decree, the court . . . must not let judicial inertia take hold. The court, 
rather than blindly following the agency’s lead, must make its own inquiry into the 
issue of reasonableness before entering judgment.”). 
 123. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 419. 
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same sort of full-blown arbitrariness review designed for final agency action 
should not apply ex ante to an agency’s request for judicial approval of a con-
sent decree.124 
Second, Citigroup I’s approach leaves room for judges’ policy preferences to 
influence their review of proposed enforcement decrees. As explained above, 
Judge Rakoff criticized the SEC for making arguably reasonable (if surely con-
troversial) policy choices. He critiqued the agency’s long-held policy of allowing 
defendants to settle without admitting liability. And he questioned the agency’s 
decision not to charge Citigroup with more serious statutory violations. 
Above all else, Citigroup I is a decision concerned with extracting more in-
formation from the SEC about its decisionmaking process. To be sure, that is 
not a bad thing—as this Article explains below, courts arguably should engage 
in more information forcing than the Second Circuit’s framework would seem 
to allow. And even the Second Circuit, situated at the other end of the deference 
spectrum, acknowledges that courts must sometimes pry more information 
from litigants before approving an enforcement decree.125 
But information forcing should not be boundless, and courts reviewing 
proposed decrees should require only enough information to facilitate review. It 
is difficult, of course, to say how much information forcing is “optimal” as a 
general matter.126 A court’s informational needs will naturally differ from case 
to case. But murky as that general question may be, one thing seems plain when 
it comes to enforcement decrees: where the agency is necessarily seeking a com-
promise with the defendant, the court does not, as Judge Rakoff suggested, need 
to know “the real truth”—embodied in “cold, hard, solid facts, established ei-
ther by admissions or by trials”—to assess whether it should approve a de-
cree.127 A consent decree is, by definition, an agreement.128 The parties, forging a 
compromise, usually “each give up something they might have won had they 
 124. See Rossi, supra note 23, at 1056. 
 125. See Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 296 (“On remand, if the district court finds it 
necessary, it may ask the S.E.C. and Citigroup to provide additional information 
sufficient to allay any concerns the district court may have regarding improper 
collusion between the parties.”); see also id. at 295 (“As part of its review, the 
district court will necessarily establish that a factual basis exists for the proposed 
decree.”). 
 126. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 88, at 1604. 
 127. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335; see id. (stating that, “in any in any case like this 
that touches on the transparency of financial markets whose gyrations have so 
depressed our economy and debilitated our lives, there is an overriding public 
interest in knowing the truth”). But see Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 295 (“Trials are 
primarily about the truth. Consent decrees are primarily about pragmatism.”). 
 128. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (Bryan Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004) (defining a consent 
decree as “[a] court decree that all parties agree to”). 
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proceeded with the litigation.”129 For the prosecuting agency, this often means 
forfeiting the chance to prove its allegations. Requiring the parties to reveal “the 
real truth” underlying the agency’s complaint would likely bring this sort of ne-
gotiated law enforcement to a grinding halt. Perhaps that is a desirable out-
come.130 Maybe it is a terrible one.131 But either way, it is not an outcome for the 
judiciary to direct. 
Third, the Citigroup I approach opens the door to another troubling possi-
bility. By critiquing the SEC’s choice to charge Citigroup only with negligence, 
Citigroup I suggests that federal courts can second-guess an agency’s prosecuto-
rial charging decisions.132 But a long line of cases suggests that is not allowed. 
The most prominent member of that long line is Heckler v. Chaney.133 
There, the Supreme Court strongly signaled that federal courts are powerless to 
review an agency’s discretionary decision not to pursue a given criminal or civil 
 129. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971); see id. at 681-82 (“Consent 
decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced 
agreement on their precise terms . . . . Naturally, the agreement reached normally 
embodies a compromise . . . . Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a 
purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the 
resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective 
parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve.”); cf. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 
690 F.2d 616, 631 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Although the district court must clearly set forth 
in the record the reasons for approving [a class action] settlement in order to 
make meaningful appellate review possible, the court’s reasoning need not be so 
specific as to amount to a judgment on the merits . . . . It is not the burden of the 
proponents or the duty of the district court to support individual elements of the 
decree under some evidentiary standard akin to that for findings of fact.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 130. See Kaul, supra note 114 at 558-64 (arguing that the SEC should require admissions 
in all enforcement actions); see also id. at 562 (“Admittedly, the SEC will likely 
have to drop some cases and devote more resources to each case it does 
pursue . . . . However, the trade-off will encourage greater quality in enforcement 
practices.”). 
 131. See Peter Lattman, Court Hears Arguments on Judge’s Rejection of S.E.C.-Citigroup 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/08/appeals-court-hears-arguments-over-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-citigroup-
settlement/ (quoting Brad Karp, a lawyer for Citigroup, as claiming that “[t]he 
federal regulatory enforcement regime would screech to a grinding halt” if the SEC 
required admissions of wrongdoing); Robert Khuzami, Director, Div. of 
Enforcement, SEC, Public Statement by SEC Staff: Court’s Refusal to Approve 
Settlement in Citigroup Case (Nov. 28, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2011/spch112811rk.htm (“Refusing an otherwise advantageous settlement solely 
because of the absence of an admission . . . would divert resources away from the 
investigation of other frauds and the recovery of losses suffered by other investors 
not before the court.”). 
 132. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
 133.  470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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prosecution.134 Though Heckler only concerned reviewability under the APA, 
the Court’s reasoning is still instructive here. The Court held that an agency’s 
decision not to enforce the law is “general[ly] unsuitab[le]” for review for sev-
eral reasons.135 First, the agency must engage in a “complicated balancing of fac-
tors” before deciding to prosecute an alleged violation: whether it has the requi-
site resources, whether it should expend those resources on the violation in 
question, whether the prosecution is likely to be successful, and whether the en-
forcement action would align with the agency’s general policies.136 Those factors 
fall squarely within the realm of the agency’s expertise.137 Second, agencies can-
not possibly prosecute every violation of the statutes they are tasked to enforce, 
and reviewing courts are relatively ill-equipped to decide how agencies should 
best expend their limited resources.138 Finally, an agency’s reluctance to institute 
an enforcement proceeding is akin to a prosecutor’s decision not to indicta 
choice that “has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive 
Branch.”139 
For all these reasons, a district court is in a poor position to question an en-
forcement agency’s charging choices. And to the extent that Citigroup I also 
questions the SEC’s decision to settle in the first place, there is a strong argu-
ment that the court is ill-equipped for that task, too. Indeed, several lower 
courts applying Heckler have held that an agency’s decision to settle an en-
forcement action is no different from an agency’s choice not to bring a proceed-
ing at all.140 The same multitude of factors is at play: Are there adequate re-
sources, and should those resources be spent this way? Will the prosecution be 
 134. Id. at 831. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 831-32. 
 138. Id.; see also id. at 842 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“As long as the agency is choosing 
how to allocate finite enforcement resources, the agency’s choice will be entitled to 
substantial deference, for the choice among valid alternative enforcement policies 
is precisely the sort of choice over which agencies generally have been left 
substantial discretion by their enabling statutes.”). 
 139. Id. at 832 (majority opinion). 
 140. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that 
a third party could not challenge an agency’s prior decision to settle an 
enforcement action against a regulated entity); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Law v. 
FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that an FCC decision to enter 
into a consent decree was unreviewable). N.Y. State Dep’t of Law held that 
“[w]here an agency determines, for whatever reason, that it has a greater chance of 
recovery under one measure alone or that its resources are best devoted to 
pursuing recovery under that measure, it should be free to proceed under that 
calculation, absent a statutory requirement to the contrary.” Id. 
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successful? Would enforcement align with the agency’s current policies?141 
There is little reason to think a that court is any more competent to weigh in 
under these slightly different circumstances. 
 
B. Citigroup II: How the Second Circuit Overcorrected 
 
In reversing the district court and setting out a new framework, the Second 
Circuit overcorrected and allowed the deference pendulum to swing too far in 
favor of presumptive approval. The Second Circuit’s approach may optimize 
regulatory flexibility by giving agencies significant leeway to enforce the law as 
they see fit. But it also places an unrealistic obligation on district courts to ferret 
out impropriety, and it may leave them unequipped to provide any meaningful 
oversight of those agency decisions that, while apparently untainted by “corrup-
tion” or “collusion,” are still not the product of reasoned decisionmaking.142 
Above all else, Citigroup II is concerned with procedural reasonableness. It 
holds that district courts should “primar[ily] focus” on whether proposed en-
forcement decrees are procedurally proper.143 It instructs courts to use “objec-
tive measures” to assess things like (1) the agreement’s basic legality, (2) its clari-
ty, (3) whether it resolves the claims in the complaint, and (4) whether it is 
“tainted by improper collusion or corruption of some kind.”144 These require-
ments are surely important, and other courts would be wise to demand that 
consent decrees satisfy them. But the opinion leaves little room for courts to as-
sess enforcement decrees for substantive reasonableness. While the court 
acknowledged that “additional inquir[ies]” beyond those four factors may be 
warranted in some circumstances, it made clear that any such inquiries must 
focus on an enforcement decree’s procedural validity, not its substance.145 
This blinkered focus on procedure is problematic. It will likely allow—or 
even require—courts to approve enforcement decrees that may appear substan-
tively unreasonable. For example, imagine an agency brings separate enforce-
ment actions against three similarly situated entities, each with comparable re-
sources, and each accused of the same illegal conduct under similar circum-
circumstances. The first two actions settle the same week on identical terms, 
with those entities remitting $100,000 and promising never to break the law 
again. Courts approve enforcement decrees in both cases. But the third action 
settles on much harsher terms a week later. The entity agrees to pay $1 million 
and consents to an injunction requiring years of costly internal corporate re-
structuring. The agency offers no explanation for why the third settlement is so 
different from the first two. Under Citigroup II, a court is mostly powerless to 
 141. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 142. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 295 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 294-95. 
 145. Id. 
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figure out why there’s such a significant disparity between these hypothetical 
actions. The court might wonder, for example, if the earlier agreements were 
relatively lax because the agency is cozier with those particular parties. But the 
Second Circuit’s “collusion or corruption” mechanism won’t be helpful here—
the prior settlements are not before the court, and there is no apparent basis for 
thinking the third, harsher settlement is “tainted” by improper influence.146 
Citigroup II also places an unrealistic onus on district courts to seek out 
reasons for rejection: absent a “substantial basis” in the record to conclude that 
the proposal is unfair, is unreasonable, or disserves the public interest, the dis-
trict court must approve the enforcement decree.147 As a practical matter, this 
means judicial pushback—whether through additional information forcing or 
outright rejection—will be extremely rare. First, bear in mind that an enforce-
ment decree starts with a joint proposal. Unless some third party seeks to inter-
vene and object, the court will hear no adversarial argument on whether the 
proposal is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest.148 It is difficult, then, to 
imagine how or why any such joint submission might reveal a “substantial ba-
sis” for concern.149 If anything, the parties will be incentivized to gloss over any 
problems lurking in the proposal, thereby minimizing any information that 
might raise a specter of unfairness or unreasonableness. Second, district courts 
are busy. Though one hopes judges will take time to scour the limited record for 
potential red flags, approval will always be the easier path. To be sure, approval 
may generally be easier any time a court confronts an unopposed joint request 
for relief—but ordinarily the parties still bear the burden of convincing the 
court to act.150 By contrast, here a court must approve a proposed consent de-
cree unless it somehow finds a “substantial” reason not to do so. 151 When lay-
 146. Id. at 295-96. 
 147. Id. at 294. 
 148. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional 
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 926-27 (“[U]nlike settlements of 
private suits against the government, which frequently attract input from a variety 
of interested parties, courts may review heavy-handed settlements of government 
suits against private parties without the benefit of this critical outside perspective 
because the only party with an incentive to object has promised to remain 
silent.”). 
 149. See Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 294. 
 150. See, e.g., Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(“The proponents of class action settlements bear the burden of developing a 
record demonstrating that the settlement distribution is fair, reasonable and 
adequate.” (alterations and internal quotations marks omitted)); In re Cendant 
Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 151. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 294. 
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ered atop a framework that myopically focuses on procedural sufficiency, this 
burden makes for an excessively high presumption of approval.152 
 
C. A Suggested Middle Ground 
 
The approaches taken by the district and circuit courts in Citigroup embody 
different visions of a judge’s role in policing agency enforcement actions. In the 
eyes of the Second Circuit, judges should not meddle with the terms of a pro-
posed enforcement decree unless the agreement is unlawful or procedurally im-
proper. But Judge Rakoff and those who have followed his lead believe that fed-
eral judges cannot play regulatory “handmaiden” and take the agency at its 
word each time—they must instead exercise independent judgment to assess 
whether a proposal is grounded in fact and properly aligned with the agency’s 
statutory duties.153 These divergent visions seem to contemplate two different 
worlds: one where we generally trust all enforcement agencies to fulfill their du-
ties and achieve desirable results with minimal oversight, and another where we 
assume enforcement agencies will stray too far from their statutory tasks absent 
robust judicial involvement. Neither vision is complete. 
In light of the flaws in these disparate approaches, this Article offers a few 
suggestions for courts that have yet to calibrate a framework for reviewing pro-
posed agency enforcement decrees. But I tread carefully in doing so. Barely a 
year has passed since the Second Circuit decided Citigroup II, and to date only a 
handful of district courts have applied its new standard.154 It may turn out that 
Citigroup II allows for more substantive review than the court’s opinion sug-
gests. But unless and until it becomes apparent that Citigroup II provides the 
optimal degree of judicial oversight, other courts may wish to consider some 
alternatives. 
Burden the parties, not the court. Instead of requiring that district judges ap-
prove an enforcement decree whenever the parties’ joint submissions do not 
evince “substantial” signs of a problem155, courts should require the parties to 
show that their proposal is up to snuff. Under Citigroup II, settling parties have 
little reason to come forward with more than bare, minimal claims that their 
 152. See Note, supra note 6, at 1291 (arguing that the Second Circuit’s “purely 
procedural test . . . will, practically speaking, result in the rubber-stamping of 
consent decrees”). 
 153. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Van Gilder, No. 12-
CV-02839, 2014 WL 1628474, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2014) (“Like Judge Rakoff, I 
will not be a mere handmaiden to a settlement negotiated on unknown facts.”) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 154. See, e.g., SEC v. CR Intrinsic Inv’rs, LLC, 26 F. Supp. 3d 260, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(approving proposed enforcement decree); United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., No. 14-CV-936 KMK, 2014 WL 3057960, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) 
(same). 
 155. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 294. 
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settlement is fair, is reasonable, and does not disserve the public interest. In-
deed, in its initial proposal to Judge Rakoff, the SEC devoted less than one dou-
ble-spaced page to explaining why the proposal satisfied these requirements.156 
Now that the Second Circuit has reversed Judge Rakoff and implicitly endorsed 
that very proposal, judges can expect similarly sparse requests moving for-
ward.157 This will make it hard for courts to assess the propriety of proposed en-
forcement decrees.158 
Requiring more of the parties might result in a desirable, but not unduly 
onerous, information-forcing effect. For example, courts could take a cue from 
the class action settlements context and simply require that the parties develop 
and furnish a record that allows the reviewing court to consider the requisite 
factors.159 If the record doesn’t enable the court to assess fairness, reasonable-
ness, and the public interest, the proposal will not be approved unless and until 
the parties remedy the information problem. This is very different from what 
Judge Rakoff seemed to do: require that the parties reveal “the truth” underly-
ing the agency’s accusations.160 As the Second Circuit observed, “Consent de-
crees are primarily about pragmatism,” whereas “[t]rials are primarily about the 
truth.”161 This proposed burden shifting, by contrast, would merely require a 
slightly more robust front-end showing before the parties can convince the 
court that a consent judgment—backed by the “drastic and extraordinary” 
remedy of injunctive relief—is appropriate.162 
 156. Memorandum by Plaintiff SEC in Support of Proposed Settlement at 6-7, 
Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-CV-07388). 
 157. The panel did not expressly approve the proposed decree. It remanded and 
allowed Judge Rakoff to reconsider the proposal under the new standard of review. 
Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 294, 298. One panel member wrote separately to say that 
he would order Judge Rakoff to approve the proposal. Id. at 298 (Lohier, J., 
concurring). On remand, Judge Rakoff found he had no choice under “the very 
modest standard imposed by the Court of Appeals” but to approve the proposed 
decree. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 379, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
 158. See James B. Stewart, Reassessing Reversal of Adversary to S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, June 
14, 2014, at B1 (quoting Professor Erik Gerding as suggesting the Second Circuit “is 
basically making it next to impossible to review any kind of [SEC] settlement”). 
 159. See, e.g., Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 160. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
 161. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 295 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 104-109 and 
accompanying text. 
 162. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010). Though inverting 
the burden could increase the price of winning judicial approval, higher 
decisionmaking costs might carry attendant benefits. Cf. Sharkey, State Farm 
“With Teeth,” supra note 88, at 1605 (“[P]rompting agencies to develop a robust 
record is desirable to the extent that it . . . leads to better regulatory outcomes, 
including forcing agencies to look for less costly ways to fulfill their statutory 
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Allow for limited substantive review based on objective considerations. In re-
acting to Judge Rakoff’s order, the Second Circuit was preoccupied with craft-
ing a framework that leaves little room for a reviewing judge’s policy prefer-
ences to enter the mix. This led to an opinion that is virtually silent as to 
whether judges can ever question the substantive reasonableness of a proposed 
enforcement decree. 
Courts should clarify that parties seeking enforcement decree approval 
must still account for substantive as well as procedural reasonableness and fair-
ness. By requiring the agency to offer some explanation of its decision to settle 
on the proposed terms, the judiciary can still serve as a backstop against en-
forcement decrees that, while procedurally sound, are substantively suspect. 
Importantly, the judiciary can enforce this requirement while still guarding 
against the possibility that judges will displace an agency’s reasonable  
policy-driven prosecutorial choices. The key, I suggest, is requiring that courts 
limit their review to a few objective considerations that, consistently applied, 
might expose or discourage unreasonable agency action. Recall Citigroup II’s 
emphasis on using “objective” measures to ensure that courts “tak[e] care not 
to infringe on the S.E.C.’s discretionary authority to settle on a particular set of 
terms.”163 By hewing to this limitation instead of engaging in a freewheeling as-
sessment of reasonableness and fairness, reviewing courts can draw from a wid-
er palette of considerations—one that includes some substantive factors—
without engaging in judicial policymaking. 
The agency seeking court approval can allude to concrete, verifiable consid-
erations like whether and how the proposal differs from recent settlements with 
similarly situated defendants. Agency consistency has long influenced how 
courts assess agency action. After all, “[g]overnment is at its most arbitrary 
when it treats similarly situated people differently.”164 If an agency proposes a 
decree that differs remarkably from recent settlements with similarly situated 
defendants, and if the agency then fails to explain that difference, a court may 
mandates.”); Stephenson, supra note 88, at 777 (“Greater judicial skepticism of 
regulation . . . generally leads to better records, less agency action, and greater 
average expected benefits for the actions that the agency undertakes.”). 
 163. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 295. 
 164. Etelson v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 684 F.2d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) 
(“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or 
without a change in circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply 
a reasoned analysis.” (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 
852 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Indep. Petroleum Ass’n 
of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“An agency must treat 
similar cases in a similar manner unless it can provide a legitimate reason for 
failing to do so.” (citation omitted)); Doubleday Broad. Co. v. FCC, 655 F.2d 417, 
423 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining that the agency “may not decide a case one way 
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be justified in rejecting the proposal. 165 To be sure, agencies should not be re-
quired to handle similar enforcement actions the same way in every instance. 
Neither should agency decisionmakers be restricted by the discretionary en-
forcement choices of their predecessors. But if an agency’s enforcement deci-
sions are demonstrably, remarkably inconsistent within a short period of time, 
it is at least reasonable to expect the agency to explain those disparities when 
seeking an enforcement decree.166 
Reconsider the “adequacy” requirement. Third, and finally, courts might 
consider keeping “adequacy” as part of the inquiry. The Second Circuit omitted 
adequacy from its standard, correctly observing that the requirement—though 
present in SEC consent decree cases for decades—appears to have been appro-
priated from the class action settlement context.167 But it is far from clear that 
this adoption was improper or mistaken. After all, public law litigation is 
unique in “its tendency to affect individuals and groups who are not parties to 
the litigation.”168 All federal enforcement agencies take actions that, however 
 165. The federal district courts’ decades of experience with the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines suggests that this sort of comparative inquiry is an administrable one. 
When sentencing criminal defendants, courts must consider “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012). Just as courts 
can explain why comparable criminal defendants are not really similarly situated, 
or why any disparities between similarly situated defendants are not unwarranted, 
see, e.g., United States v. Soto, 660 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 2011), federal agencies 
can account for consistency when seeking enforcement decrees by explaining 
whether, how, and why the decree differs from similar recent agreements with 
comparable regulated parties. 
 166. In Citigroup I, for example, the court asked the SEC to explain a notable disparity 
between (a) the $95 million penalty it sought from Citigroup and (b) the $535 
million penalty it exacted from Goldman Sachs in a comparable consent decree 
entered the prior year. 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see Consent 
Judgment, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 1:10-CV-03229-KBF (S.D.N.Y. July 
20, 2010). To Judge Rakoff, Goldman “involved . . . similar but arguably less 
egregious” allegations, but there the agency sought significantly higher monetary 
penalties than it did against Citigroup. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334 n.7. 
 167. Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 294. 
 168. Kramer, supra note 4, at 321; see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976) (“Because of its regulatory base, 
public law litigation will often, at least as a practical matter, affect the interests of 
many people.”); Nancy P. O’Brien, Arbitration Allocates Costs of Hazardous Waste 
Cleanup Claim Under Superfund, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 347, 360 (“One hallmark of 
public-law litigation is its tendency to affect third parties.”); cf. Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 30 
(“[C]onsent decrees often are designed to affect the rights of strangers.”); Justin P. 
Gunter, Dual Standards for Third-Party Intervenors: Distinguishing Between Public-
Law and Private-Law Intervention, 66 VAND. L. REV. 645, 647 (2013) (“[I]n public-
law litigation, third parties have a far greater justification for [intervening].”). 
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remote, impact third parties. The spectrum of third-party impacts is vast. 
Sometimes the effect is exceedingly attenuated, as in an SEC enforcement action 
against an individual accused of insider trading.169 At the other end of the spec-
trum, when the agency litigates on behalf of a class otherwise barred from fur-
ther relief, third-party interests run especially high.170 But what about the wide 
swath of cases in the middle? Cases where, like in Citigroup, the agency isn’t liti-
gating on behalf of a class, yet outside parties might stand to benefit directly—
such as via restitution—from the enforcement action?171 One where only the 
agency, and not private litigants, can bring claims for certain violations?172 Per-
haps adequacy matters there, too. 
Instead of applying Citigroup II’s binary framework—which assumes that 
adequacy matters only when the agency is actually litigating on behalf of indi-
vidual plaintiffs directly entitled to relief—courts should demand adequacy in 
all enforcement decrees, each time accounting for whether and how the decree 
may impact third parties.173 When third-party interests run relatively low, as in 
 169. Even in those cases, the SEC has historically acknowledged that some judicial 
assessment of adequacy is still in order. See, e.g., Plaintiff SEC’s Second 
Unopposed Motion for Entry of Proposed Final Judgment as to Defendant 
Michael Van Gilder and Relief Defendant Stephen Diltz at 10, SEC v. Van Gilder, 
No. 1:12-CV-02839-JLK (D. Colo. May 5, 2014) (requesting that the court find a 
proposed enforcement decree “adequate” in an action against individuals accused 
of insider trading). Indeed, in appealing Judge Rakoff’s order, neither the agency 
nor the bank challenged the widely-used “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 
framework. See Brief of Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Defendant-Appellee Cross-
Appellant at 15, Citigroup II, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 11-5227-cv (L); 11-
5375-cv(con); 11-5242-cv(xap.)) (arguing that Judge Rakoff’s approach implicitly 
departed from the “fair, reasonable, and adequate” rubric, which the agency 
described as “the standard uniformly applied by hundreds of federal district 
courts . . . over the past several decades”); see also id. at 20 (referring to it as “the 
only standard imposed by federal courts across the country”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging 
a court’s “heightened responsibility” to protect the public interest when a consent 
decree affects the public interest or third parties). 
 171. See Zimmerman, supra note 86, at 504 (explaining that in recent decades federal 
agencies have played an increasingly significant role in seeking restitution for 
victims outside of the class action context); see also Kaul, supra note 114, at 564 
(“The monetary penalties obtained in SEC settlements are typically divided 
between the U.S. Treasury general fund and a ‘fair fund’ set up to compensate 
harmed investors.”). 
 172. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that private 
investors cannot bring securities claims based on negligence). 
 173. A recent student note in the Harvard Law Review makes the related point that “it 
is not clear how a district court could consider [any] substantive factors—such as 
deterrence—if adequacy is beyond its purview.” Note, supra note 6, at 1292. The 
author goes on to argue that the “adequacy” requirement—which perhaps is 
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the insider trading example, it will be easier for a proposal to meet the require-
ment. But when third-party impacts loom larger—like where, as in Citigroup, 
the agency had the power to forge an agreement guaranteeing restitution to vic-
tims otherwise powerless to recover via private litigation—the agency should at 
least acknowledge those potential effects and explain whether and how the pro-
posal will serve or frustrate third-party interests. 
Though this Article suggest that courts still examine “adequacy” and keep 
other substantive considerations in the mix, this proposed framework is still 
different from Judge Rakoff’s approach. It allows for only limited substantive 
review guided by objective considerations like agency consistency. Hard look 
review, by contrast, permits a more searching inquiry guided by open-ended 
questions: Did the agency fail to account for “an important aspect of the prob-
lem”?174 Did it rely on factors it was not supposed to?175 Did its decision “run[] 
counter to the evidence before” it?176 If courts ask these sorts of questions when 
reviewing proposed enforcement decrees, they run the risk of “infring[ing] on 
the [agency’s] discretionary authority to settle on a particular set of terms.”177 
To be sure, any framework that permits substantive review of agency en-
forcement proposals will leave open the possibility that judges will improperly 
interfere with the executive branch’s policymaking authority. But as Citigroup II 
demonstrates, federal appellate courts are capable of checking occasional over-
policing by district courts. And under this proposed framework—which allows 
district judges to exercise a more constrained degree of substantive oversight—




Enforcement decrees are highly important to federal agencies, regulated 
parties, and the public at large. Agencies rely on enforcement decrees to secure 
more efficient resolutions of enforcement actions. Regulated parties can use 
such settlements to resolve allegations of wrongdoing at a lower price, and often 
without admitting liability. And the public benefits from, but also bears the 
consequences of, agency law enforcement via private negotiation. So the scruti-
ny courts give to proposed enforcement decrees matters tremendously. 
Calibrating judicial review in the absence of statutory guidance requires 
that courts make foundational assumptions about how deference facilitates (or 
frustrates) desirable outcomes. The disparate frameworks employed by the dis-
trict and circuit courts in Citigroup suggest two divergent visions of the judici-
impossible to sever from the “fair” and “reasonable” requirements in the first 
place—is administrable and “well within judicial competency.” Id. 
 174. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Citigroup II,  752 F.3d at 295. 
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ary’s relationship with the “fourth branch”178: one skeptical that enforcement 
agencies will adhere to statutory mandates absent the looming threat of sub-
stantive judicial oversight and another concerned that unelected judges will do 
more harm than good by engaging in substantive ex ante review of agency en-
forcement decrees. In advancing a third framework drawing from both ap-
proaches, this Article suggests that courts can still play a limited role in policing 
agency enforcement decrees for substantive unreasonableness while leaving dis-
cretionary policy-driven decisions to politically accountable agencies. 
The approach proposed here might still permit the majority of reasoned, 
routine, and expertise-driven agency enforcement decrees to earn judicial ap-
proval with minimal scrutiny. Of course, when compared to the Second Cir-
cuit’s approach in Citigroup II, this framework will require slightly more front-
end process from agencies seeking judicially backed settlements. Though pro-
cess makes decisionmaking more expensive, this framework’s attendant costs 
might well be minimal—and, in any event, they could prove a worthy price for 
Article III backing.179 After all, agencies like the SEC have a panoply of other en-
forcement tools at their disposal.180 If an agency decides that seeking a consent 
decree would be too onerous, it can always settle out of court. Some agencies, 
like the SEC, are even statutorily authorized to prosecute enforcement actions 
in administrative proceedings.181 But if an agency wants a court decree enforce-
able by the contempt power, it must explain why that result would be proce-
durally and substantively sound. 
 
 178. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (remarking 
that administrative bodies “have become a veritable fourth branch of the 
Government”). 
 179. See Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth,” supra note 88, at 1655 (explaining that 
additional process can serve as a “‘price’ for judicial deference to agency policy-
making”). 
 180. See, e.g., Citigroup II, 752 F.3d at 297 (“[T]o the extent that the S.E.C. does not wish 
to engage with the courts, it is free to eschew the involvement of the courts and 
employ its own arsenal of remedies instead.”). 
 181. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(a), 78u-3(a) (2012). These tools may, however, be 
troubling for other reasons. See Peter J. Henning, S.E.C. Faces Challenges Over the 
Constitutionality of Some of Its Court Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 
2015), dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/s-e-c-faces-challenges-over-the-constitu 
tionality-of-some-of-its-court-proceedings; Jean Eaglesham, S.E.C. Is Steering 
More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/ 
sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590 (reporting that the 
SEC is bringing more and more enforcement actions before its own administrative 
judges, where the agency enjoys a “considerably higher” success rate than it does 
in federal jury trials); see also SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 
379, 380 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“One might wonder: from where does the 
constitutional warrant for such unchecked and unbalanced administrative power 
derive?”) (approving proposed decree on remand). 
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